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Introduction
An international discourse of China-in-Africa has emerged, particularly in Western countries with dense links to Africa, such as the US, the UK and France. While China’s presence in Africa should be critically 
examined, interest in the West is skewed by elite perceptions of China as a 
rival for resources and infl uence in Africa, and the tone of the discourse is 
far more negative than that accorded the Western presence in Africa.
The discourse is partly about how China’s presence is a “bad infl uence” 
on governance in Africa.1 A concomitant idea is that China’s activities ob-
struct Africa’s development, a contention that fi ts in a right-to-development 
framework.2 A New York Times editorial exemplifi es how the discourse plays 
out in Western media; its title, “Patron of African Misgovernment,” refers to 
China.3 It states that if African countries put natural resources in hock to the 
PRC, China will write them big checks, without questions about corruption 
or authoritarianism. China is said to engage in “callous yuan diplomacy,” 
enjoy “an ugly partnership” with the “genocidal” Sudan government, and 
treat Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe as its “favorite,” contributing to 
Zimbabweans’ lack of free elections and “sane economic policies.” The Times 
avers that China is pushing the poorest African workers deeper into poverty 
by fl ooding Africa with cheap goods and lending to African states without 
insisting on standards that Western states purportedly promote through the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The Times also expressed 
outrage at a PRC company’s exploitation of Zambian miners. 
The essence of the discourse then is to cast PRC policies in Africa as 
promoting human rights violations or “colonialism.”4 Some PRC activities 
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in Africa do violate the human rights of Africans—not in ways that Western 
elites claim, but in much the same manner that Western policies do, through 
disadvantageous terms of trade, the exploitation of natural resources, op-
pressive labour regimes, and support for authoritarian rulers, all common 
features of the modern world system. These are practices that China’s elites 
used to denounce, but now come close to extolling as dynamic capitalism. 
For example, in 2007, a PRC international publication ran an article by 
Jian Junbao, a scholar from top-ranked Fudan University, on charges of 
“Chinese colonialism” in Africa. He stated that “more and more companies 
from China are entering Africa, but they simply focus on profi ts regardless 
of their harmful infl uences on African society, such as environmental pollu-
tion, excessive development and exploitation of local labor.” Jian nevertheless 
argued that the path taken by China is “consistent with the logic of market 
capitalism-liberal trade” and makes China not a colonialist, but “a successful 
capitalist in Africa.”5
The discourse should not be inverted by arguing that China’s presence in 
Africa is positive and the West’s negative or that problematic Chinese activities 
in Africa are justifi ed because abuses are shared with the West. The analysis 
of China-Africa should invoke neither a “win-win” nor dystopic representa-
tions; rather, the trees of China’s behaviour should be seen as part of a world 
system forest and the discourse examined using comparative analysis. Our 
arguments are threefold: 1) given the world system, it is diffi cult to assess 
the pluses and minuses of China-in-Africa as a single phenomenon; 2) as a 
player in the world system, China in Africa has more in common with the 
West than is usually acknowledged; 3) there are nevertheless notable dif-
ferences between Western and Chinese presences in Africa, many of which 
derive from China’s experience as a semi-colony, its socialist legacy, and its 
developing country status, features which together make PRC policies pre-
sumptively less injurious to African sensibilities about rights than those of 
Western states.6 In what follows, we focus on PRC activities in Africa often 
denounced as harming African interests. We also examine why the China-
in-Africa discourse has emerged as it has and whether Africans agree with 
its main tenets. 
Africa’s Development and China’s Imports
China-Africa trade is rising sharply. Only US$3 billion in 1995, it was $74 
billion in 2007, balanced slightly in Africa’s favour. While China’s 2006 trade 
__________________
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with Africa was merely 3 percent of its US$1.76 trillion foreign trade and less 
than the US’s $91 billion Africa trade, the PRC was in third place, behind the 
US and France, among Africa’s trade partners.7 China asserts that its trade 
is responsible for 20 percent of Africa’s economic growth.8
The discourse concerns both China’s imports from and exports to Af-
rica. On imports, it focuses on oil and charges that China fosters Africa’s 
dependence on earnings from raw materials. A Canadian scholar has noted 
the frequent assertion that “Beijing’s demand for African oil and other raw 
materials has inevitably helped to perpetuate Africa’s reliance on oil exports 
and, in so doing, further prevent the growth of more labor-intensive indus-
tries, such as agro-business and manufacturing.”9 
Ten percent of Sub-Saharan African exports went to China in 2005; fi ve 
oil and mineral exporting countries accounted for 85 percent of PRC im-
ports from Africa. In 2004, oil and gas accounted for 62 percent of Africa’s 
exports to China, ores and metals 17 percent, agricultural raw materials 7 
percent.10 This profi le is not unusual: apart from South Africa, the continent’s 
manufacturing is largely confi ned to textiles and clothing, which China 
also produces in abundance. In fact, oil accounted for 80 percent of 2005 
US imports from Sub-Saharan Africa; apparel was less than 3 percent, with 
minerals most of the remainder. Petroleum products accounted for 92.3 
percent of the value of goods imported under the US’s preferential African 
Growth & Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2005.11 
About 47 percent of the oil China consumed in 2006 was imported. PRC 
imports were 6.8 percent of the world oil trade and supplied 12 percent of 
all energy China consumed.12 China’s 2005 oil imports from Africa provided 
4 percent of China’s energy needs. Of the 31 percent of PRC oil imports that 
came from Africa, Angola’s share was 14 percent, Sudan’s 5 percent, Congo 
(B)’s 4 percent, and Equatorial Guinea’s 3 percent.13 African oil supplied 
__________________
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11  US Department of Commerce, U.S.-African Trade Profi le (Washington: International Trade 
Administration, 2006), pp. 1, 2, 12. 
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at 7.01 mln bpd,” XH, 10 November 2006; “China’s Thirst for Energy Complicating Global Policy,” 
Petroleumworld. com, 18 January 2006, available at <www.petroleumworld.com/story06011809.htm.
13  Erica Downs, China (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2006), p. 31. Similarly, Nigeria ac-
counts for 11 percent of US crude imports. Paul Ohia, “US Warns of Terrorist Attacks,” This Day (TD) 
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14.5 percent of all oil China consumed in 2006, hardly different from US 
imports from Africa of 13.2 percent of all oil it consumed, imports that pro-
vided 5.2 percent of US energy needs.14 China imports oil largely to fuel its 
production: 70 percent of its demand is for industrial uses, while 70 percent 
of US demand is for motor vehicles.15 In 2006, China received 8.7 percent of 
Africa’s oil exports; Europe took 36 percent and the US 33 percent.16 China 
thus hardly dominates Africa’s oil markets. The China-in-Africa discourse, 
however, represents the PRC as aspiring to be the chief taker of African 
resources and as interested in Africa only on that account.17
China does participate in an exploitative business: historically, the price of 
oil and other globally traded primary products, relative to that of industrial 
commodities, have been signifi cantly determined by asymmetries in political 
power.18 Apart from the “unequal and disparate exchange” that affects oil 
and primary products generally,19 oil is capital intensive, creates few jobs, is 
environmentally damaging and corrupts producing states. People in oil-rich 
regions, such as southern Sudan and Nigeria’s Niger Delta, receive so few 
benefi ts from their patrimony that violent confl ict has ensued.20
China is in Africa for oil because 80 percent of the world’s proven con-
ventional oil reserves are state-owned and account for two-thirds of oil pro-
duction. Most remaining reserves are sown up by Western oil fi rms.21 China 
takes oil in Africa differently than Western states: it often packages oil deals 
with infrastructure project loans.22 From the 1970s, developed states and in-
__________________
14  B. McKenna, “Don’t Expect ‘Energy Independence’ to Clear the Air on Climate Change,” 
Globe & Mail (Toronto) (G&M), 30 January 2007 (US imported 60.3 percent of oil it consumed in 
2006); David Bird, “Africa Tops Mideast for US Crude,” Houston Chronicle (HC), 25 February 2007 (22 
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no. 1006 (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2007), p. 2; Hamish Macrae, “We Fail to Work with China 
at our Peril,” The Independent, 14 February 2007, p. 32.
18  See Bassam Fattouh, “The Origins and Evolution of the Current International Oil Pricing 
System: a Critical Assessment,” in Robert Mabro, ed., Oil in the 21st Century: Issues, Challenges and Op-
portunities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 41-100.
19  Peter Custers, “Unequal Exchange and Poverty in African Countries Exporting Primary Com-
modities,” European Conference of People’s Global Action, 2 September 2002, Amsterdam, available 
online at <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/pgaeurope/leiden/poverty_africa.htm>.
20  Terry Lynn Karl, “The Social and Political Consequences of Oil,” in Cutler Cleveland, ed., 
Encyclopedia of Energy (San Diego: Elsevier, 2004). Angolan oil creates twice as many jobs per million boe 
(barrels of oil equivalent) in the US than in Angola. Keith Myers, “Petroleum, Poverty and Security” 
(London: Chatham House Africa Programme Briefi ng Paper, 2005), p. 6. 
21  Lynn Cook, “Big Oil Hashes Out Issues with State-Run Firms,” HC, 17 September 2004. 
Oil pumped by Chinese national oil companies abroad accounted for less than 1 percent of global 
production in 2006 and at least two-thirds of that was sold on the international market. Erica Downs, 
“China’s Quest for Overseas Oil,” Far Eastern Economic Review (September 2007), pp. 52-56.
22  In the period 1956-2005, China provided US$44 billion in low- or no-interest loans to African 
states for 900 infrastructure projects. “China Looks to Africa with an Eye to Reaping Financial and 
Political Gains,” Associated Press (AP), 18 June 2006.
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ternational fi nancial institutions (IFIs) largely abandoned African infrastruc-
ture projects, which also receive little private and almost no public-private 
fi nancing.23 International investment in infrastructure in Africa amounted 
to 4 percent of all such investment outside North America from 1992-2003, 
even though lack of infrastructure is blocking Africa’s development.24
China has worked on African infrastructure for four decades and is becom-
ing its pre-eminent infrastructure builder. The World Bank (WB) estimated 
that as of mid-2006, China’s Export-Import Bank infrastructure loans to Africa 
amounted to over $12.5 billion. In 2007, this bank pledged $20 billion in 
infrastructure and trade fi nance loans related to Africa over the next three 
years, on top of the $5 billion China-Africa Development Fund, announced 
in 2006 at the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, to encourage PRC 
investment in Africa.25 While G8 fi nance ministers have criticized China’s 
loans, on the ground that a “lend and forgive cycle” should be avoided, NGOs 
point out that only $2.3 billion of the additional $25 billion in aid pledged 
to Africa by rich countries in 2005 has been delivered.26 
 China’s approach to acquiring oil in Africa is exemplifi ed in the China-
in-Africa discourse by a 2004 agreement with Angola. The discourse fi xes 
on it because the deal involved infrastructure loans to the corrupt Angolan 
government, unaccompanied by a requirement to report how the funds were 
spent. The initial loan of US$2 billion was to be used for railroad repair, road 
building, offi ce construction, etc. It was to be repaid with oil from a former 
Shell Oil block that generates 10,000 bpd. The block had been sought by the 
largest Indian oil fi rm, but secured by China because of its infrastructure loan, 
which was set at 1.5 percent interest, to be recouped over 17 years, including 
__________________
23  Robert Shephard et al., “Financing Infrastructure in Africa,” Gridlines no. 13 (September 
2006), p. 2.
24  Tony Elumelu, “Obstacles and Opportunities to Financing Infrastructure Projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa: the UBA Experience” (Washington: UBA 2006), available online at <www.africacncl.
org/downloads/2006_IC/Elumelu.pdf>;
 United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2007 (New York: UN DE&SA, 2007), p. 105. 
25  “Financial Collaboration a New Focus in China-Africa Economic Cooperation,” XH, 17 May 
2007. By mid-2007, China’s Exim Bank had provided more than $13.2 billion in loans for Africa-related 
projects; those still outstanding were 20 percent of the bank’s business. “Briefi ng: Asia Banking,” Asia 
Pulse, 30 July 2007. The loans went 40 percent to the power sector, 20 percent to transport, 12 percent 
to telecom, 4 percent to water and 24 percent to multi-sector commitments; see Broad (2005), p. 
275. Most of the $20 billion pledged in 2007 will fi nance exports of Chinese “high-tech” products 
used to build infrastructure in Africa. Wang Jian-Ye, “What Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa?” 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2007), p. 10; “The Export-Import Bank of China,” avail-
able at <http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/profi le/introduction.jsp>. 
26  “G8 Raps China for Lending $20b to Africa,” United Press International (UPI), 21 May 
2007. When debt relief, which the G8 regards as aid, is eliminated from calculations, G8 aid to Africa 
declined by 2 percent from 2005 to 2006. Jeffrey Sachs, “Empty Promises,” South China Morning Post 
(SCMP), 24 April 2007. China does not consider debt relief as aid. Darren Taylor, “Chinese Aid Flows 
into Africa,” VOANews, 8 May 2007, available online at <www.voanews.com/english/Africa/Chinese-
Aid-Flows-into-Africa.cfm>.
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a 5-year interest-free period. It reserved for Angolans 30 percent of the value 
of infrastructure contracts paid for with its funds; the remaining 70 percent 
was open for bids, although most contracts have likely gone to PRC fi rms.27 
The interest rate was later lowered to 0.25 percent. By 2007, China had lent 
Angola at least $6 billion for infrastructure projects.28
In response to the Angolan and other PRC loans, WB head Paul Wol-
fowitz, the UK government, and the IMF all declared that PRC activities 
threatened to plunge Africa into deep debt. The US Treasury termed China 
a “rogue creditor.”29Africa remains, however, in a Western-created “debt 
trap,” owing more than $300 billion and paying signifi cant interest.30 Yet, as 
US Africanist Deborah Brautigam has noted, China “regularly cancel[s] the 
loans of African countries, loans that were usually granted at zero interest 
[and] without the long dance of negotiations and questionable conditions 
required by the World Bank and IMF.”31 For example, a highway opened in 
2006 between Ghana’s two major cities, Accra and Kumasi, was built with a 
PRC no-interest loan.32 
OECD researchers have concluded moreover that increased PRC activi-
ties in Africa have not deepened corruption among African governments.33 
China’s leaders know corrupt offi cials will siphon off part of the infrastructure 
loans, but its packaged loans are less likely than Western aid to be drained 
by corruption. As a Hong Kong journalist has noted, because China’s loans 
__________________
27  “Angola: Oil Backed Loan Will Finance Recovery Projects,” Integrated Regional In-
formation Networks (IRIN), 21 February 2005, available online at <www.irinnews.org/ report.
asp?ReportID=45688>; IRIN, “Angola: Cautious Optimism for 2005,” 14 January 2005, available 
online at <www.irinnews. org/report.asp?ReportID=45077>; “Angola/China: an Example of South-
South Cooperation,” Angolan Press Agency, 25 March 2004; Cindy Hurst, China’s Oil Rush in Africa 
(Washington: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2006), p. 10. 
28  Lucy Corkin, “Angola Flexes New-Found Muscle,” Business Day (BD) (South Africa), 23 March 
2007; Gill, “China’s Expanding Role,” p. 9. A reviewer has informed us of unpublished information 
that China’s loans to Angola total as much as $13 billion.
29  Kaburu Mugambi, “China-Africa Ties Come Under Fresh Scrutiny,” The Nation (Kenya), 12 
December 2006; “Beijing Summit: Implications for Africa,” TD, 5 November 2006; Michael Phillips, 
“G-7 to Warn China over Costly Loans to Poor Countries,” WSJ, 15 September 2006, p. A2. 
30  “It’s Trade Not Aid that will Lift Africa from Poverty,” East African (Kenya), 8 November 2005. 
Sub-Saharan Africa paid $8.3 billion in interest in 2003; George Kerevan, “So we all Take to the Streets. 
Will it Work?” Scotsman, 2 June 2005. Until 2005, countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia were 
spending as much as 40 percent of their national budgets on debt repayment. “Debt in Africa,” Mbendi, 
4 July 2005, available at <www.mbendi.co.za/land/af/p0060.htm>. 
31  Deborah Brautigam and Adama Gaye, “Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa?” Council 
on Foreign Relations, 14 February 2007, available at <http://www.cfr.org/region/143/africa.html>. 
Former WB economist William Easterly has argued that debt relief presents a moral hazard by encour-
aging relieved countries to expect additional relief after future borrowings. See William Easterly, The 
White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2006). Of course, the fact that China has so far consistently provided debt relief 
to African states does not guarantee it will continue to do so in the future. 
32  “Chinese Investors Outpace Indians, British in Ghana,” AFP, 17 June 2006.
33  Andrea Goldstein et al., China and India: What’s in it for Africa? (Paris: OECD 2006), p. 53.
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and aid are tied to infrastructure projects, “corrupt rulers cannot somehow 
use it to buy Mercedes Benzes.”34A close US observer of PRC activities in 
Africa has argued that China’s aid is more effective than Western aid because 
much is used for “hydroelectric power dams, railroads, roads and fi ber-optic 
cables, which have the potential to benefi t ordinary people, no matter how 
corrupt the regime under which they live.”35
Despite promoting a rhetoric of transparency regarding African oil-pro-
ducers, Western states have not bound their citizens to a code of conduct. 
Bids for oil blocks in Africa typically feature “signature bonuses,” paid to 
governments, which often run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Foreign oil fi rms know there are striking difference between what they pay 
and what host governments retain after skimming. In a rare instance of dis-
closure, Western oil fi rms told the IMF that they paid $400 million in 2001 
for an Angolan oil tract, but the Angolan government claimed it received 
only $285 million.36
Angola’s state oil company and president’s offi ce control oil earnings. 
Investigators have traced hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses and 
bribes paid by Western multinationals to Angolan offi cials’ private offshore 
accounts. Most multinationals refuse to publish what they pay. Western 
governments do not compel oil fi rms run by their own citizens to make dis-
closures, but instead “ask the tiger for its skin” (yu hu mou pi), as the Chinese 
say, by demanding corrupt governments publicize their own corruption.37 
Western policy interventions have not actually diminished the resource 
curse.38 A group of African scholars has argued that transparency is insuf-
fi cient as a means to end oil-related corruption, which cannot be dented 
as long as African offi cials and the (mainly Western) oil executives who 
corrupt them tolerate such criminality. Their actions can hardly be policed 
through the UK government’s EITI , because it is voluntary and puts the 
onus of disclosure on African governments.39 The NGO-promoted campaign 
to require fi rms to Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is aimed at mandatory 
disclosure by publicly-traded natural resource companies, but not non-traded 
__________________
34  Frank Ching, “Cosy Ties, but China Needs to do more for Africa,” Business Times, 13 July 2005.
35  Jennifer Brea, “China’s New Scramble for Africa,” American.Com: a Magazine of Ideas Online, 
23 November 2006, available online at <www.american.com/archive/2006/november/chinas-new-
scramble-for-africa>. 
36  “Signing On,” Petroleum Economist, 2 October, 2004, p. 1. 
37  John McMillan, “Promoting Transparency in Angola,” Journal of Democracy 16:3 (2005), pp. 
155-169.
38  See John Ghazvinian, Untapped: the Scramble for Africa’s Oil (New York: Harcourt, 2007).
39  Nicholas Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: the Dirty Politics of African Oil (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 
pp. 217-218. While China is said to have no regard for transparency, Baroness Whitaker stated in a 
House of Lords debate that due to its connections with international organizations, “China may be 
interested in supporting the principles of EITI.” See “Africa: Chinese Investment,” Lords Hansard, 6 
February 2007, Column 670. 
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or state-owned fi rms. PWYP has been resisted by most Western oil companies, 
especially US fi rms.40
Western media often cite the WB-Chad agreement to ameliorate the 
resource curse and spur poverty alleviation as a successful external policy 
intervention to curb oil-based corruption. In exchange for a modicum of 
WB fi nancing to build the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline—the largest private 
sector investment in Sub-Saharan Africa—Chad has since 2003 deposited 
most royalties from Exxon-Mobil and other pipeline operators in a London 
bank. Foreign overseers monitor the account and disperse funds to Chad, 
mainly for poverty alleviation programmes. When the pipeline was built, 
oil prices were low and multinationals were unwilling to risk building it 
without WB backing. A study has found that the WB-Chad pact is “a unique 
one-off event determined by a particular set of historical circumstances that 
no longer hold.” With high prices and tight supplies, oil fi rms no longer 
need WB approval for projects. The WB-Chad pact is also judged to be very 
limited in geographical scope and duration and unlikely to do much to al-
leviate poverty.41 
The China-in-Africa discourse will likely continue to focus overwhelmingly 
on oil in discussing PRC imports from the continent. American analysts par-
ticularly see the US as strategically competing with China for African oil.42 
By February 2007, Africa was supplying 24 percent of US daily oil imports, 
ahead of the 18.6 percent from the Middle East.43 The US government esti-
mates African oil production will increase by 91 percent in 2002-2025, while 
global production will increase by 53 percent. Armed forces in a new Africa 
Command will be tasked with protecting US access to oil.44
 US prominence in taking African oil is accompanied by its practice of 
__________________
40  Afeikhena Jerome et al., “Addressing Oil Related Corruption in Africa: Is the Push for Trans-
parency Enough?” Review of Human Factor Studies 11(1) (2005), pp. 7-32. Ethiopian Premier Meles 
Zenawi has stated that “it would be wrong for people in the West to assume that they can buy good 
governance in Africa [which] can only come from inside . . . [China] does not in any way endanger 
the reforms of good governance and democracy in Africa because only those that were home-grown 
ever had a chance of success.” See “Ethiopia: PM Opposes ‘Neo-Liberal’ Economic Reforms,” Africa 
News, 17 February 2007.
41  Scott Pegg, “Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the Chad-
Cameroon Pipeline Project,” African Affairs (AA) 105/418 (2005), pp. 1-25.
42  Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” Current History 105 (691) 
(2006), pp. 219-224; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, “The African ‘Oil Rush’ and American Na-
tional Security,” Third World Quarterly 27:4 (2006), pp. 22-35; Gregory Kane, The Strategic Competition 
for the Continent of Africa (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2006); Donovan Chau, Political Warfare 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa 
(Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2007).
43  Hector Igbikiowubo, “U.S. Military to Help Secure Oil,” Vanguard (Nigeria), 22 May 2007.
44  Michael Klare, Blood and Oil: the Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependence on 
Imported Oil (New York: Metropolitan, 2004), pp. 144; Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: US Strategic 
Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa,” Congressional Research Service, 16 May 2007.
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backing authoritarian rulers in almost all oil-producing states.45 Sudan is 
a partial exception: the US cooperates with and protects Sudan’s military 
intelligence leaders, who are actually the Sudanese offi cials most responsible 
for crimes against humanity in Darfur, but opposes its Islamist politicians.46 
US elites use that partial exception and PRC involvement in Sudan’s oil 
industry to keep the discourse focused on China’s supposed “scramble for 
oil,” even though China is still far from capable of competing with Western 
fi rms for control of African oil.47 Furthermore, much of the oil that China 
takes from Africa, including Sudan, is not brought to China, but traded on 
the open market.48 
Africa’s Development and China’s Exports 
China’s exports to Africa have also been sharply criticized, as low-quality 
goods which poorly serve consumers and foster the decline of African 
__________________
45  See, e.g., Paul Lubeck et al., “Convergent Interests: US Energy Security and the ‘Securing’ of 
Nigerian Democracy,” International Policy Report, February 2007, p. 10. After the rigged 2007 Nigerian 
election, the US stated that Nigeria is a strategic partner and it would continue to work with the country. 
Constante Ikokwu, “US: Nigeria Still Strategic Partner, Despite Election Flaws,” TD, 19 May 2007. 
46  Paul Moorcraft, “Strange Bedfellows in Khartoum,” BD, 22 June 2007; Greg Miller, “U.S. Relies 
on Sudan Despite Condemning It,” LAT, 11 June 2007 (US-Sudan intelligence “liaison visits every 
day”); US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 30 April 2007, available online at <http://
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm> (Sudan is “a strong partner in the war on terror”). 
China has supplied 20 percent and Russia 40 percent of Sudan’s arms imports. Mark Bromley and 
Andrea Goldstein, “What China Model can do for Africa,” Financial Times, 16 February 2007. France 
and other states also arm Sudan; see F. William Engdahl, “Darfur: Forget Genocide, There’s Oil,” Asia 
Times, 25 May 2007, available online at <www.atimes.com/atimes/China_ Business/IE25Cb04. html>. 
On China’s role in persuading Sudan to accept UN peacekeepers in Darfur, see Jonathan Holslag, 
“China’s Diplomatic Victory in Darfur” (Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2007). 
Despite Darfur, after the 2005 Khartoum-southern Sudan peace deal, US oil fi rms have renewed their 
interest in Sudanese oil. See Matthew Chen, “Chinese National Oil Companies and Human Rights, 
Orbis (Winter 2007), pp. 41-54. India, which partners with China and Malaysia in developing Sudan’s 
oil, supports Sudan’s position on Darfur. See Luke Patey, “A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behavior 
of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in Sudan” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
International Studies, 2006), p. 37.
47  Jedrezej George Frynas and Manuel Paul, “A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Politi-
cal and Business Perspectives,” AA 106:423 (2007), pp. 229-251. Some 95 percent of oil produced in 
Africa’s largest petro-state, Nigeria, is generated by fi ve Western companies: Shell, Exxon, Chevron, 
Total and Agip. 
48  Darren Taylor, “Concerns Mount about Chinese Oil Interests in Africa,” VOANews, 3 May 
2007, available online at <www.voanews.com/english/Africa/Concerns-=Mount-about-Chinese-Oil-
Interersts-in–Africa.cfm>; Nicholas Freeman, The Dragon on the Nile: China’s Pursuit of Energy Security 
in Sudan (Annapolis: US Naval Academy, 2006), p. 79. Less than 9 percent of oil imports into China 
in 2006 was equity oil. Euro-Asia Group, “China’s Overseas Investments in Oil and Gas Production” 
(Washington: US-China Economic and Security Review Committee, 2006), p. 3. Oil from Sudan was 
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Relations,” China Security vol. 3, no. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 42-68.
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manufacturing.49 In much of Africa, many basic consumer items are expen-
sive imports from developed countries, yet because poor infrastructure and 
corruption in Africa create high production costs, these are often cheaper 
than locally made goods.50 Chinese goods are cheaper than both and thus 
appeal to poor Africans. PRC goods in Madagascar are two to three times 
cheaper than local or imported goods.51 As more Chinese go to Africa and 
compete with each other, prices fall. In the Congo capital of Kinshasa, PRC 
merchants fi rst sold shoes for the price of US$12 a pair; as more Chinese 
arrived, the price fell to $6.52 In Ghana, as more PRC bikes were imported, 
the price fell from $67 to $25 in two years.53 
 If the affordability of PRC imports benefi ts African consumers,54 there 
are in any case only seven countries that receive a signifi cant share (5 to 14 
percent) of their imports from China.55 Basic consumer goods do not pre-
dominate among PRC exports, but rather “machinery, electronic equipment 
and high- and new-tech products.”56 A UK government study found that in 
only one African country, Uganda, are basic consumer goods more than a 
fi fth of the value of all goods imported from China, and that PRC imports 
into Africa mainly displace imports from elsewhere and have little effect on 
local production.57 The PRC government recognizes that some exports are of 
__________________
49  Michael Wines, “China’s Infl uence in Africa Arouses Some Resistance,” NYT, 10 February 2007, 
p. 3; “Frankenstein in Africa: China Sets Out to Destroy Africa’s Manufacturing Sector,” 1 January 
2007, available online at <http://pundita.blogspot.com/2007/01/frankenstein-in-africa-china-sets-
out-html>.
50  “Zambia to Initiate Campaign to Boost Local Products Consumption,” XH, 16 August 2005. 
Due to poor infrastructure, even if Africans worked for free in manufacturing, their goods would still 
not be able to compete with PRC goods. Nigel Harris, The Return of Cosmopolitan Capital: Globalization, 
the State and War (London: Taurus, 2003). Many African countries similarly cannot compete with 
Latin American states in the production of items like T-shirts. See Uma Subramanian and Matthias 
Matthijs, “Can Sub-Saharan Africa Leap into Global Network Trade?” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper no. 4112 (2007). 
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Fournet-Guerin, “New Chinese Immigration in Antananarivo,” Chinese Perspectives no. 67 (2006), pp. 
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Individual Entrepreneurs’ Gold Rush in Africa: Hardship in Building a Business; Dare to Think 
Dare to Do], Renmin Wang, 17 August 2005, available online at <http://chinese.people.com.cn/
GB/42316/3622666.html>.
53  “Is the Awakening Giant a Monster,” The Economist, 13 February 2003, p. 56.
54  These consumers are not limited to purchasers of basic commodities. Many African busi-
nesses buy Chinese goods, often machinery, inputs to production, and wholesale commodities. See, 
for example, George Laghu, “How Chinese are Taking Over Kampala’s Business Hub,” New Vision 
(Uganda), 2 May 2007. 
55  Jane Kennan.and Christopher Stevens, Opening the Package: the Asian Drivers and Poor-Country 
Trade (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies [IDS], 2005), p. 2.
56  “China to Promote Trade, Economic Links with Africa in 2006,” XH, 6 January 2006. 
57  Chris Edwards and Rhys Jenkins, The Effect of China and India’s Growth and Trade Liberalisation on 
Poverty in Africa (London: UK Department for International Development, 2005), pp. 28-29, 38. Such 
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poor quality. Many Chinese goods are brought to Africa by private Chinese 
or African entrepreneurs whom the PRC government does not control. It 
nevertheless has “in place stringent measures to ensure that its goods meet 
all the minimum quality standards for exports [and] a ministry to ensure 
low quality goods are not exported.”58 
 While most Chinese exports to Africa do not displace existing local 
producers, PRC exports to the world also have not had the commonly as-
serted crushing effect on African exports.59 The Export Similarity Index, a 
measure of overlap between the value of products countries export, reveals 
only a 4 percent overlap for China and the whole of Africa and almost exclu-
sively involves textiles and clothing (T&C).60 The China-in-Africa discourse 
features a constant stream of charges that China is gutting African T&C 
production.61 
 China’s T&C exports to Africa began to rise sharply around 2003, but 
in many African countries, the T&C industry had long been in decline. In 
Ghana, T&C employed 25,000 people in 1977, but only 5,000 in the year 
2000.62 In Zambia, 25,000 people worked in T&C in the 1980s, but the number 
was down to only 10,000 in 2002. During the 1960s and 1970s, many African 
countries practiced import-substituting industrialization, raising T&C em-
ployment to 20 to 30 percent of formal sector jobs. By the 1980s and 1990s 
however, when most African countries had lost their ability to service their 
debt, the IFIs insisted that they open up to foreign goods, de-industrializing 
some countries, particularly with regard to T&C.63 
__________________
58  Nick Thiong’o, “China Unveils Move to Curb Sub-Standard Exports,” Kenya Times, 23 November 
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corporate social responsibility. Stephen Marks, “The Summit in Beijing,” Pambazuka News, 14 December 
2006.
59  This is not to argue that in some sectors and with regard to certain potentialities, the impact 
is not signifi cant. See Raphael Kaplinsky et al., “The Impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa,” April 
2006, available online at <http://www.uneca.org/eca_programmes/acgd/Overview_Report.pdf>.
60  Robert Devlin, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), table 5.5.
61  See, for example, Karen Palmer, “Asian Imports Gutting African Textile Trade,” SCMP, 14 
December 2005, p. 9. Africa’s 2003 T&C exports were worth US$2.3 billion, less than 1 percent of a 
$400 billion world trade. “How Many Will Closure of Textile Company Affect?” New Era (Namibia), 
22 January 2007. 
62  Peter Quartey, “The Textile and Clothing Industry in Ghana,” in Herbert Rauch and Rudolph 
Traub-Merz, eds., The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bonn: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, 2006), pp. 135-146. By March, 2005, the industry only employed 3,000. 
63  Rudolf Traub-Merz, “The African Textile and Clothing Industry: From Import Substitution 
to Export Orientation,” in Rauch and Traub-Merz, The Future, pp. 9-35. The 2001 fi lm T-Shirt Travels 
(http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/tshirttravels/fi lm.html) shows that after the 1991 opening 
of Zambian markets to trade in second-hand clothes, every clothing factory closed. Claims have been 
made that Chinese goods destroyed the textile industry in Zimbabwe. See Brigitte Weidlich, “Cheap 
Chinese Goods Destroyed Zim Economy,” The Namibian, 28 August 2007. However, the head of the 
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 WB/IMF-mandated structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were the 
actual gravediggers of African T&C production. The infl ux of second-hand 
clothing from developed countries particularly reduced domestic markets 
for African T&C producers.64 Kenya in the 1990s, for example, opened up 
the textile sector to second-hand (mitumba) and new garments from the US 
and EU, whose increased subsidization of their cotton farmers also shrunk 
the Kenyan cotton industry, reducing supplies to Kenyan T&C producers. 
Neo-liberal reforms in Kenya raised the cost of electricity and other inputs, 
making it still more diffi cult for T&C fi rms to produce at low prices. While 
mitumba distribution came to involve 500,000 Kenyans, the country’s T&C 
industry, which in the early 1980s employed 200,000, nearly collapsed. Up to 
70,000 factory and mill jobs alone were lost.65 By 2004, even with the effect 
of the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act, less than 35,000 people 
worked in the export-oriented Kenyan clothing sector.66 
 Meanwhile, by 2001, Chinese T&C exporters were in the midst of a period 
of vast growth.67 Despite strong competition and massive job losses, PRC-
based fi rms’ share of world T&C exports grew from 9 percent in 1990 to 24 
percent in 2005.68 T&C exports accounted for 70 percent of China’s 2006 
$177b global trade surplus.69 From 1974, the Multifi bre Arrangement (MFA) 
restricted China’s T&C exports to developed countries. The 1994 WTO 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) kept MFA quotas until January 
1, 2005, after which African T&C exports to the US initially fell 20 percent. 
__________________
International Textile Garment and Leather Workers Federation pointed out in 2004 that “in Zimbabwe 
some 20,000 textile and clothing jobs have disappeared directly or indirectly due to imported used 
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Zimbabwe, unpublished PhD dissertation, Coventry University, 2000, p. 301. 
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com/en/assets/english/shc_0905.pdf>. 
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January 2007; Gloria Otieno, Trade Liberalization and Poverty in Kenya: A Case Study of the Cotton Textiles 
Subsector (Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2006). 
66  Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris, “Dangling by a Thread: How Sharp are the Chinese 
Scissors?” (Brighton: IDS, 2006),p. vi, available online at <http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/
globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/RKDanglingbyathread.pdf>.
67  Duane Newman, “Duane’s World,” BD, 4 December 2006; Mills Soko, “SA Can Cut Lessons 
from Chinese Cloth,” BD, 19 October 2006.
68  “Lesotho Shows Textile Woes are About More than China,” BD, 1 July 2006. About one-third 
of China’s textile exports are made by “foreign” (mostly Hong Kong or Taiwan) owned fi rms. “E-TV 
Interview with Charge d’Affaire Mr. Zhou Yuxiao,” PRC Embassy, South Africa, 13 April 2006, avail-
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69  “Poorer Nations Feel China’s Weight,” International Herald Tribune (IHT), 3 April 2007, p. 14. 
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In several countries, T&C employment dropped sharply in 2005-2006,70 
predictably due to “relatively high utility and transportation costs and long 
shipping times to the US . . . lower productivity and less skilled labor than 
Asia, and . . . fewer sources of cotton yarn and higher-priced fabrics than 
China and India.”71
 Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco and South Africa have featured in the 
China-in-Africa discourse as especially hard-hit by Chinese competition. 
Yet except for South Africa their industries were already in extremis by 2000. 
Their eventual outcomes are also at odds with the discourse of the PRC as 
gravedigger of Africa’s T&C industry. In Lesotho, T&C bosses have been 
foreign (mainly from Taiwan and Hong Kong) and employ most of the 
country’s formal sector workers. In 2006, they rebranded themselves as 
producers of “ethical clothing” for the US market, allowing almost full em-
ployment recovery.72 In Madagascar, which lost 5,000 of 100,000 T&C jobs in 
2005, the industry found a niche in higher-end T&C, held its own in 2006, 
and is expected to grow in 2007-2008.73 Moroccan textile exports began to 
recover as producers moved up the value chain and oriented themselves to 
just-in-time production for the European market, 50 to 60 percent of whose 
requirements cannot be fulfi lled by an exporter as far away as China.74
 In 2003-2006, South Africa’s T&C industry purportedly shed 55,000 jobs, 
18,000 of them since late 2004. Besides the infl ux of PRC products, the rand 
appreciated 50 percent in 2002-2004, making South Africa, Lesotho and 
Swaziland exports more expensive.75 South African T&C fi rms also cannot 
source cheap Asian fabric for goods sent to the US at AGOA preferential 
tariffs.76 South Africa’s T&C industry suffers from little capital investment 
__________________
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Outlook for 2007-08: Economic Growth,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 7 March 2007. 
74  “Moroccan Textiles Manufacturers . . .” Reuters (TV), 28 March 2007, available online at 
<http:rtv.rtvlondon.co.uk/2007-03-28/30fb69ca.html>.
75  Traub-Merz, “The African Textile,” pp. 17, 25. South Africa’s unions estimated 60,000-70,000 
jobs lost, but the University of Cape Town School of Economics found that only a third of that number 
of jobs had actually disappeared; other jobs were informalized. Dave Marrs, “Chinese Textile Quotas 
a Case of Too Little, Too Late,” BD, 13 November 2006. 
76  Kaplinsky, “The Impact,” p. 13. About 85 percent of cloth used in African apparel exports 
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and poor management. Its growing informalization has led to deskilling 
and compromises in quality.77 The employment effect of the infl ux of PRC 
T&C goods should also be put into a wider context. A University of Johan-
nesburg economist has shown that the availability to South African retailers 
of cheap Chinese T&C imports has greatly increased employment in that 
sector, which is the main contributor to South African GDP. The increase in 
retail jobs more than compensates for T&C job losses.78 In any case, China 
fi xed quotas for 2007-2008 on 31 types of T&C exports to South Africa. South 
Africa’s government opines that will reduce PRC imports by a third and 
create roughly the number of jobs lost since 2003.79 The PRC government 
also agreed to fi nance a $2.5-million South African T&C training programme 
and will “mak[e] preferential loans available to South Africa in modernizing 
its textile industry if it is needed.”80 
 It is not easy to draw a summary of the positive and negative impacts of 
China’s exports to Africa. Yet, as is the case for the T&C industry, the balance 
is less negative than the discourse makes out. Its fi xation on Africa’s T&C 
industry is non-comparative and lacks historical context, as China did not 
contribute to the steep decline in African T&C through SAPs, while Western 
states have yet to restrict their used and new clothing exports to Africa. 
Africa’s Development and China’s Investments
 Most foreign direct investment (FDI) infl ows to Africa come from Europe, 
along with South Africa and the US. These countries together account for 
more than half of Africa’s FDI infl ows. China had only $49 million in FDI in 
Africa in 1990 and $600 million in 2003. Its FDI stock in 2005 was $1.6 billion, 
of $57 billion in global PRC FDI. In 1979-2000, the most recent years for 
which fi gures are available, 46 percent of PRC FDI in Africa went to manu-
facturing (15 percent to textiles alone), 28 percent to resource extraction, 18 
percent to services (mostly construction) and 7 percent to agriculture. The 
__________________
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PRC has said it will encourage investment in Africa’s industrial processing, 
infrastructure, agriculture and natural resources.81
 Investment that PRC fi rms have realized or pledged to Africa is increasing 
so quickly that it is thought to have reached $11.7 billion by the end of 2006 
and includes manufacturing, trade, transportation and agriculture.82 China 
will likely soon be a main source of FDI for Africa, especially as PRC govern-
ment entities offer tax incentives, loans, credit and ready access to foreign 
exchange for enterprises that undertake FDI activities abroad.83
Investments thus also fi gure in the China-in-Africa discourse.84 Even 
more than with trade, the discourse is narrowly focused, primarily on only 
one investment by one Chinese SOE, among the more than 800 major PRC 
enterprises in Africa, 100 of them large SOEs.85 Western media have devoted 
hugely disproportionate attention to the Non-Ferrous Company-Africa 
(NFCA) Chambishi copper mine.86 The upshot of these reports is that “the 
Chinese” are portrayed as Africa’s super-exploiters.
 The question of whether conditions at Chambishi are extraordinarily 
oppressive is considered but not fully answered in a 2007 report by two 
Zambian NGOs. It argues that privatization is the main cause of the sharp 
deterioration in Zambian miners’ conditions. The report also notes NFCA 
is commonly claimed to be the worst investor in Zambia’s Copperbelt; the 
Indian company, Vedanta, is judged next worse, and that “Swiss, British, 
South African, Canadian, and other investors typically labeled ‘white,’” are 
said to be the best. The report adds that ”the debate is clearly informed by 
racist assumptions . . . and a fair sprinkling of frequently repeated urban 
myths.”87
 NFCA’s purchase of the defunct Chambishi mine, in 1998, restored op-
erations and boosted employment from 100 to 2,200 (of 39,000 miners in 
Zambia).88 However, the mine was the site of an April, 2005 dynamite plant 
explosion that killed 47 Zambian workers. During a 2006 wildcat strike over 
payment delays, two protestors were shot. Few of the mine’s Zambian work-
ers have permanent pensionable contracts, in contrast to its 180 Chinese 
__________________
81  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: 
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Zambia’s Copper Mines (Lusaka: Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia and Catholic Centre for Justice, 
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employees. NFCA has made it hard for unions to represent its contract work-
ers and it has paid the lowest wages among private mining fi rms in Zambia. 
There are eleven Chinese, but only one Zambian, senior manager. Mining 
families had free health care when the mine was Zambian state-owned, but 
now fi nd it hard to access mine hospitals. Although many miners and their 
families suffer from HIV/AIDS, there is little preventative health care. The 
townships where miners live have been poorly serviced.
 Until recently, Zambia’s government largely ignored conditions in the 
mines. More recently, it threatened to punish NFCA and other owners who 
acted “outside the normal” and “put the Government to ridicule.” In 2006, 
the lowest paid workers’ wages were increased, but were still only about the 
minimum wage.89 In any case, many Zambians fi nd conditions at all mines 
to be much worse than before privatization and blame the government for 
having acceded to WB demands to rapidly turn over the mines to multi-
nationals. Indeed, the WB and IMF made release of a half billion dollars of 
balance of payments support conditional on Zambia’s quick completion of 
privatization.90
 The NGOs’ report states that among Zambian mines there is “plenty 
of poor practice, particularly at Metorex,” a white South African fi rm that 
owns 90 percent of the Chibuluma mine, where it carries out exploitative 
activities detailed in the report.91 A Canadian fi rm, First Quantum Metals 
(owner of the Kansanshi mine) and Metorex have resisted Zambian gov-
ernment efforts to raise royalty rates to 2.5 to 3 percent, to better support 
education and health programmes. Most foreign mining fi rms now pay what 
are likely the lowest royalty rates in the world.92 Metorex, which earned the 
highest mining profi ts in Zambia in 2006,93 First Quantum and Vendanta 
(owner of the large Konkola mine) all pay 0.6 percent royalties and a 25 
percent corporate tax rate. According to an NGO report, however, NFCA 
pays 2 percent royalties and 35 percent taxes.94 In 1992, when copper was 
$2,280 a ton, the state-owned mines provided more than $200m to Zambia’s 
__________________
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treasury. In 2004, with copper at $2,868 and the same level of production, 
the now foreign-owned mines provided only $8 million. In contrast to the 
pre-privatization years, these mines now also generally have no linkages that 
enrich local communities. Only a minority of fi rms run health and education 
services for employees and their families.95
 The Chambishi copper mine owners are harsh exploiters, to be sure, but 
it is misleading to portray the situation in Zambia as consisting of a hierarchy 
of relatively good white bosses, worse Indian mine operators, and super-
exploiting Chinese.96 The head of the opposition Patriotic Front, Michael 
Sata, running for president in 2006, said he would drive out the Chinese, 
Indians and Lebanese, whom he called “infestors.”97 Sata received funds 
from Taiwan and said he would recognize it in place of the PRC. He visited 
Taiwan after he lost the race, while some of his followers attacked Chinese-
owned shops in Lusaka.98
 The Chambishi mine is by no means the largest Chinese-owned enterprise 
in Africa. A private, Chinese-owned conglomerate in Nigeria, with which 
many PRC SOEs partner in manufacturing and construction, has 30,000 
employees, including many Nigerian managers.99 There are several large 
PRC-owned factories in Africa, such as the Urifi ki Textile Mill in Tanzania, 
with 2000 workers, and shoe and textile factories in Nigeria that employ 1000 
to 2000 workers.100 Chambishi, however, has been burned into the minds of 
those exposed to the China-in-Africa discourse.
 A comparative study would likely reveal that both PRC and Western enter-
prises in Africa impose oppressive conditions. It should be noted, however, 
that PRC investments in Africa are much less profi table than those of Western 
countries.101 The WB has observed that Africa provides “the highest returns 
__________________
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96  Western media often quote a politician who expounds that hierarchy. Guy Scott, a white 
farmer, ex-minister of Agriculture, and secretary general of the opposition Patriotic Front (PF), has 
said, “People are saying: ‘We’ve had bad people before. The whites were bad, the Indians were worse, 
but the Chinese are worst of all.’” Chris McGreal, “Chinese Infl ux Revives Colonial Fears,” Guardian, 
9 February 2007.
97  “Zambia Opposition Chief Files Complaint Over Amin Comparison,” AFP, 17 September 
2006. 
98  Amos Malupeng and Brighton Phiri, “Sata Visits Taiwan,” The Post (Lusaka), 6 February 2007.
99  Ni Yangshuo, “Servir d’intermediaire pour Faciliter les Rapports entre la Chine et le Nigeria” 
[To serve as an intermediary to facilitate rapport between China and Africa], Chinafrique, no. 10 
(2006), available online at <www.chinafrique.com/zf-2005/2006-10/2006.10-hz-1.htm>. Zhou Zihong, 
“Feizhou zui ‘niu’ de zhongguo shang ren” [Africa’s strongest Chinese businessman] Da Jing Mao no. 
1 (2008), pp. 50-53.
100  UNDP, “Asian Foreign,” pp. 59-60; Craig Timberg, “From Competitors to Trade Partners,” 
Washington Post, 3 December 2006.
101  It is often supposed that state-owned PRC construction fi rms in Africa accept a low profi t rate 
because they receive subsidies, but construction fi rms’ profi ts in China average only 2 to 3 percent. 
“High Debt Rate, Price War Haunt China’s Construction Industry,” XH, 21 March 2007. The question 
of whether Chinese fi rms also generally receive an advantage in obtaining construction contracts in 
Africa on projects fi nanced by China has not yet been resolved.
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on foreign direct investment of any region in the world.”102 In the 1990s, these 
returns averaged 29 percent and have since risen. They are much higher 
than returns of US foreign affi liates elsewhere, for example;103 yet returns 
for PRC foreign affi liates in Africa are low compared to PRC businesses in 
other regions. Unlike much Western investment in Africa moreover, most 
PRC investments are equity joint ventures with African enterprises, who 
share in profi ts. Most are small- and medium-size enterprises producing for 
African markets.104 PRC fi rms are often fl exible in responding to African 
development plans. For example, in 2007, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) banned cobalt concentrate exports. Chinese fi rms that previ-
ously bought concentrate quickly moved to set up DRC plants to produce 
copper cobalt alloy.105
 PRC investments seem also to concentrate less in natural resource ex-
traction and more in infrastructure and manufacturing than Western invest-
ments. In part this is because Western countries “ha[d] all but abandoned 
big infrastructure and industrial ventures in Africa decades ago, deeming 
them unprofi table or too risky.”106 Only 10 percent of the $22 billion of US 
FDI in Africa in 2005 was in manufacturing.107 Some 83 percent of US FDI 
is in fi ve African states. Apart from South Africa, US FDI in the other four 
states is overwhelmingly in oil and differences exist between Western oil fi rms 
and PRC parastatals: Shell and other “majors” have been in Nigeria for a 
half-century, but that oil-producing giant must import most gasoline it uses, 
while in Sudan PRC fi rms have built a structure for exploration, production, 
refi ning, transport and sales.108 China National Petroleum Company claims 
to have “provided jobs to more than 100,000 Sudanese while contributing 
to other employment sectors as the oil industry has grown.”109 
 The China-in-Africa discourse in the West for the most part insists that 
the Chinese have particularly positioned themselves to exploit Africa and 
__________________
102  World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington: WB, 2003), p. 95.
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DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), p. 3.
108  US Department of Commerce, “US-African,” p. 13. For statistics on Western oil fi rms’ African 
investments, see He Wenping, “Zhong Fei Guanxi Fazhan Chudongle Sheide Shenjing” [Whose Nerve 
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Africans.110 Several Western states, however, directly support despots by pro-
viding military assistance and legitimacy.111 China is thus not likely to fare 
worse than the West in an evaluation of how foreign investments impinge 
on development and human rights in Africa.
Conclusion
 The modalities of trade examined for development implications com-
monly involve the import and export of goods. However, there is also trade 
in money and people. Western, but not PRC, banks have traded secrecy 
and interest to the exporters of 40 percent of Africa’s private wealth.112 
Western states trade citizenship for the skills of professionals, especially 
doctors and nurses, trained in, but now largely lost to Africa.113 These forms 
of trade likely impinge as much as commodity exchange on Africans’ right 
to development.
The main problem with the China-in-Africa discourse is not empirical 
inaccuracies about Chinese activities in Africa,114 but rather the decontex-
tualization of criticisms for ideological reasons. Some analyses positively 
cast Western actions in Africa compared to China’s activities; others lack 
comparative perspective in discussing negative aspects of China’s presence, 
so that discourse consumers see a few trees, but are not given a view of the 
whole forest. Such analysis refl ects Western elite perception of national in-
terests or moral superiority as these impinge on “strategic competition” with 
__________________
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China.115 Many analysts scarcely question Western rhetoric of “aiding African 
development” and “promoting African democracy,” yet are quick to seize on 
examples of exploitation or oppression by Chinese interests.116 
 To comprehensively interrogate Chinese and Western activities in Africa 
is to question a global system that has in many respects de-developed Africa 
and into which China is increasingly integrated. Failing that, one is left with 
little more than a binary between a Western-promoted new “civilizing mis-
sion” on behalf of Africans, and the activities of the “amoral” Chinese, who 
refuse to fully endorse that mission by not adopting trade and investment 
practices wholly compliant with neo-liberalism. China, after all, can and does 
throw this binary back in the face of its proponents by portraying the West 
as seeking a new tutelage for Africans and China as eschewing the role of 
intermeddler, while promoting “win-win” trade and investment. So too do 
many Africans.117 The popularity of features of China’s presence in Africa, 
compared with that of the main Western states, goes well beyond elites.118 
The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked Africans in ten countries to 
compare the infl uences of China and the US in their own countries. In nine 
of the ten countries, by margins of 61 to 91 percent, African respondents said 
the Chinese infl uence was good. These percentages substantially exceeded 
those for the US.119 One important implication of the Chinese presence in 
Africa then is that Western states and fi rms may need to engage in greater 
self-refl ection about their own presence in the continent. 
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 The China-in-Africa discourse can be expected to become increasingly 
heated, especially with regard to the effects of PRC trade and investment on 
development, as its audiences weigh competing claims. Those who follow 
the discourse as it is played out in Africa itself can already detect that many 
Africans are wary of attempts to cast it in Manichean terms. Many Africans 
moreover are now rejecting any effort to use the discourse to distract from 
the reality of Africa’s continued subordination within a world system that 
builds in exploitation and other systematic violations of rights. 
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